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THE JUDICIAL USE OF PSYCHONARCOSIS IN FRANCE*
3. P. Gagnieur
J. P. Gagnieur, Commissaire du Gouvernement in the Financial Section of the
Judicial Courts of Paris, recently presented a brief account of the legal controversy
which arose in Paris during the last year as a result of the admissions made by a
criminal while under the influence of sodium pentothal. (See: "The Judicial Use
of Psycho-Narcosis in France," Jan.-Feb. 1949.) Upon the final disposition of the
matter with the acquittal of the court's medical expert of all charges arising out
of his investigation, Magistrate Gagnieur has prepared a comprehensive paper discussing the various questions brought about by the forensic use of psychonarcosis.
The Journal feels fortunate in presenting the views of Magistrate Gagnieur, whose
background as a graduate of the Institute of Criminology at Paris and as a former
Public Prosecutor and criminal investigator, specially qualifies him to discuss this
subject.-EDITOr.

Psychonarcosis is a psychiatric means of investigating the
subconscious and the memory. It chiefly consists in making use

of the dim period which precedes or follows sleep provoked by
a barbituric (penthotal, nesdonal, evipan, sodium amital, etc.).

In fact, when an anaesthetic is given slowly, the effects it successively produces disclose two main stages: First, during the
cerebral phase, the will is inhibited; then the reflexes, during

the medullary phase; in the course of the awakening the reverse
process is to be observed. It is then theoretically possible to
limit the effects of an anaesthetic to the sole inhibition of the will
by slowing up the sleepening, or the awakening process.
It is a well-known fact that the patient who undergoes an anaesthesia before being operated, shows frequently an exceptional
loquacity at the time when the drug begins to affect him, and
does not yet, however, act completely. It was then normal to
study how to make use of this phenomenon in order to investigate the human mind.
After the few experiments which Freud's disciples carried
out, this matter was seriously taken up again for the first time

in England by Professor J. Stephen Horsley who showed the
valuable benefits which psychiatry and psychoanalysis could derive from the practice of narco-analysis.
Its use has been expanding ever since; few psychiatrists could
assert that they never used it; in France it has been particularly studied by Professor Delay. It is recognized that, in many
* We wish to make it clear right now that the chemical and physiological means
used by the methods which aim to weakening the will and according to reliable witness would be in practice in certain Eastern European countries, having nothing in
common with the purposes of narcoanalysis. In the former case, the point is to
determine a secondary condition in the course of which the indicted becomes very
liable to suggestions and then accuses himself of fancy crimes in order to obey the
indicters' will; while psychonarcosis, far from producing an effect of suggestion
upon the patient, strives on the contrary to bring to light his true personality, and
its sole aim is the research of truth.
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cases, as it liberates the subconscious, it allows a speeding up to
a considerable extent in the course of a psychoanalysis; it also
often facilitates the medical diagnosis and has in some cases a
curative effect.
But does it enable one to obtain precise disclosures on a point
which the subject resolutely wants to keep concealed? Does it
allow a complete inhibition of the will? The experts do not
agree on this point, nor on the efficiency of the results obtained
to date by extending the dim period at the beginning of the
awakening by means of a very slow intravenous injection of a
solution of penthotal.
Professor Delay and the majority of psychiatrists assert that
psychonarcosis is not able to check the determined will of concealing a precise point, while Dr. Scharlin, chief of the neuropsychiatric department of the Regional Hospital Department
of Besangon, gives the following results of about a hundred
experiments which have been undertaken under conditions similar to these which are met with in judicial matters. In 12%
cases the results prove completely satisfactory; for instance, a
miner subjected to narcosis said the following: "It's queer
your stuff; makes one talk all right; the murderers need to be
mighty careful with you!" In 30% cases the examination is
only able to obtain precisions on secondary details, as the Will
controls the important answers; finally, in about 60% cases,
the results are completely negative.
Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account the risks of
affabulating and the suggestible condition of the patient during the experiment, but these obstacles may be dealt with. The
expert conducting the examination is able to take simple precautionary measures which everyone dealing with juvenile delinquents is familiar with, and so to avoid any risks of suggestion. At any rate, in all cases, the truthfulness of the confessionmust be controlled by a magistrate. This is so much more a
must when confession is obtained under narcosis. The danger
of affabulation, which even exists outside examinations under
narcosis, is greater in this case, but a qualified magistrate may
easily evade it.
In France, psychonarcosis has never been used for obtaining
a suspect's confession, except in a few experiments which have
no judicial value;' on the other hand, the expert physicians
have frequently used it in order to establish their diagnosis. As a
matter of fact, so far as the detection of malingering is con1 We have noted that the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune
printed lately that truth serum has been used in New Orleans, and has lead to an
admission by the offender (March 1949).
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cerned, the well-being which the malingerer feels, as well as the
even incomplete sluggishness of his will, are sufficient to cause
him to commit negligences while imitating the symptoms of his
pretended disease which, in the absence of admissions, will
inform the expert.
Our readers know already that French Justice has been confronted with such a case, and that the so-called Cens, who indicated he was an aphasic and whose malingering had been established by Dr. Heuyer, following an examination under narcosis,
has prosecuted the latter under the charge of assaults and violation of the professional secret.
The Court of the Seine has acquitted Professor Heuyer on
every count, but with a prudent wisdom it did not decide about
the lawfulness, or the opportunity of using psychonarcosis. It
just establishes that even when this use should be forbidden the
principle of the restricted interpretation of the penal texts would
allow no penalty. The Court establishes no distinction between
psychodiagnostic and examination under narcosis, contrary to
the opinion generally admitted. It is nevertheless true that the
judgment states precisely: "Dr. Heuyer had no intention at all
to take advantages of the period of asleeping or awakening of
the so-called Cens in order to proceed to an examination (which,
besides, could not bear any value) concerning the actions with
which he was charged".
But the context shows that the Court wanted to establish that
Dr. Heuyer had remained "within the limits of the mission devolved upon him". He had not to search after admissions, and
had he obtained any-with or without penthotal (and experience
proves that this assumption is not unfounded)-these admissions would have been deprived of any judicial value, as they
exceeded the limits of his duty.
Besides, had the court meant to condemn the use of examination under psychonarcosis, it may be supposed that it would not
have used a simple parenthetical clause, when the reasons it
alleges for releasing him would have applied under any circumstances. Therefore, the problem of the judicial use of psychonarcosis remains set as a whole. In order to study it we shall
leave aside the purely technical difficulties which narcoanalysis
meets at present. In fact, the methods used are only efficient so
far as the narcodiagnosis is concerned, and practically, there
are only a few cases when the examination under narcosis leads
to interesting results.
It seems however that the present techniques could be improved by further psychological and chemical research, which
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would introduce more efficient narcotics and also better methods
for preparing and examining the subject.
Therefore, it is worth discussing the use of narcoanalysis on
the grounds of principles2 and very generally on the question of
the lawfulness; but we again want to make clear that, though
they have been raised by the decision in which this article originates, we shall not examine the problem of the limits to be assigned to the physical interference of the expert physician, nor
the problem of the scope of professional secret; these matters
are important enough to become the subject of a separate study.
COTROL OF Evmmqcw

Narcoanalysis may be used towards two basically different
ends: To obtain confessions, or to control the statements of an
indicted man and check the truth of a testimony. In the latter
case it seems to be no longer a "truth-serum" but rather a means
of checking up evidence.
Practically, even when they are honest, the witnesses frequently make errors, which, in some cases, might be disclosed
by an examination under narcosis. But what should be said
about the increasing number of false witness? The oath to
speak the truth loses very much of its value in the sight of certain witnesses. This is not only a consequence of the crisis in
morality which follows war, but also of the fact that the oath,
according to French law, is deprived of its religious nature. We
have even seen the case of quasi-professional witnesses, particularly in the course of the trials for treason and collaboration.
If psychonarcosis were to give him this power, would the
magistrate have the right to check the truth of doubtful testimonies ? According to the French Law, to give evidence is compulsory for any person summoned before the court. It is a duty
for them to appear before the magistrate or the Court, and to
take oath to speak the whole truth. If they fail to appear, or refuse to take the oath, they are fined; and if they bear false
witness, they become liable to much more severe penalties.
Therefore, the law grants no liberty to the witnesses-except
this of not bearing their testimony spontaneously. The consequences of false evidences are too rigorous for the defendant
and society for every possibility to be worked out in order to
avoid it. However, the necessity of knowing the truth has led to
deprive the witness of the right of refusing to bear evidence.
It is then not exaggerated to say that the witness of an offence
2 The French Ministry of Justice has not yet sent instructions on that subject. It
cannot therefore be considered as resolved in.the facts.
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is no more the master of his own memories. He owes them to the
magistrate. The law gives the judge the right to demand that
these memories be related to him, and the witness cannot by any
means fail to meet this requirement.
Therefore the use of psychonarcosis in this case seems to raise
no objection on fundamentals. At the very moment when he
makes the oath the witness alienates his liberty, according to the
demands of law. Practically, this point has never been raised,
to our knowledge, and it seems that it never will, so long as no
better results will be obtained. It is nevertheless true that the
use of examination under narcosis appears to us in this case
completely lawful.
NARODIAGNosis AND NAcoXAmINATIox

We shall now examine the problem of the lawfulness of the use
of narcoanalysis on an accused, and we shall successively study
its two main aspects: Lie detection, and the search of admissions
or information related to the circumstances of the offence.
A basic difference between these two assumptions has been
established. Mr. Donnedieu de Vabres, professor of penal law
of the Law School of the University of Paris, who has given
evidence in the trial Cens vs. Heuyer, in favor of the psychodiagnosis, has proposed the following distinctions:
A. The experts, appointed to discover a deception, and who normally
use psychonareosis in this case, on medical grounds, should by no
means deprive themselves of part of their weapons because they are
appointed by law.
B. Deception is a lie aggravated by fraud, the use of which is unlawful;
it exceeds the limits of the simple lie, the use of which must be acknowledged to the defendant.
C. The purpose of the psychodiagnosis is not to seek out information
related to the main issue of the suit; therefore it does not deprive the
accused of his usual means of defense.
In this way psychonarcosis would be lawful, but with the only
purpose of disclosing deception. In fact, the Court did not withhold this distinction, and it seems. it was right, and that the use
of psychonarcosis must be either admitted or rejected without
deciding separately on the psychodiagnosis.
As a matter of fact, it is possible to answer in the following
way to the three arguments which Mr. Donnedieu de Vabres has
brought up:
a)-The physician who uses psychonarcosis in order to detect deception
on one of his patients acts towards a curative end which no longer
exists if he is appointed by judicial authority. Now it is this curative purpose which justifies the interfering of medicine with the
moral or physical integrity of the human being.

19491

PSYCHOABRCOSIS

IN FRANCE

b)-The difference between a malingerer who says nothing, and a liar
who deceives the magistrate, is not evident on practical grounds;
theoretically, it is hardly conceivable that certain lies could possibly
be legitimated and not others, on account that they materialize, not
through simple words, but by means of physical or mental attitudes.
If it is true that the malingerer bases his false statement on a
staging-in fact, the imitation of certain symptoms intended to
deceive the expert medical officer-one does not see clearly how his
behavior would be found more faulty than this of the simple liar
who, in order to deceive the judge, pretends to talk quite frankly.
The intellectual stand of the liar and this of the malingerer are
identical; the only difference lies in the muscles used to materialize
them.

c)-It is accurate that the purpose of the psychodiagnosis is more limited
than that of the examination under narcosis, but their basic principle
are identical. The point is to check the will of the subject; and their
results may be compared. The delinquent will be prevented from
defeating the action of justice, which was his only aim. The means
he uses, simulation or lie, is only a matter of opportunity.
There is therefore no difference in principle between the use
of psychonarcosis in order to detect malingering, and its use in
order to get the truth from the defendant himself.
We shall now look at the problem in its comprehensive aspect.
PsYcHowARcosis Aam HuIAx LiBERTY

By tradition, the defendant has a right to lie, or at least, not
to speak the whole truth in order to reserve his own defence. He
is never compelled to accuse himself, and there are few people
indeed who, like St. Thomas, deem that the delinquent owes the
whole truth to his judge. This point apparently would bear something shocking, and demanding from the defendant that he accuses himself would mean to require real heroism from him.
It is true that, though it is not a duty for him, the defendant
may however confess, which he would no longer be able to do by
use of psychonarcosis, as the admission bears only a moral
value when it is spontaneous.
Practically, the aim of psychonarcosis is not to obtain confession, in the juridical and moral meaning of. the word. Its
purpose is to find out if the offence has left traces in the memory
and subconscious or the examined person. Does this research
interfere quite inadmissibly, as sometimes alleged, with the respect of the human being?
At the very moment when the Western World, reviving the
traditions of Christian civilization, puts the stress upon the
importance of the human person, the respect due to it, and the
intangible nature of its rights, it is more and more widely ad-
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mitted that its liberty is severely limited. Besides any philosophical argument, it is recognized that any act performed
freely involves necessary results which are not free, as they no
longer depend on the originator of the initial act. The man who
presses the trigger of a revolver has no possibility of holding
back the bullet, nor to wash out the finger prints, etc. The man
who acts freely, in doing so estranges his liberty so far as all
the compulsory results of this act are concerned.
The task of police is to trace back from the discovery of these
necessary results the initial free act. But any act leaves in the
psychism of his originator necessary after-effects, which may be
compared to its physical consequences. The memory escapes the
will in the same way as the grooves of the rifling on the projectile
shot from the gun. To trace back the crime from the memory is
the same as to trace back the criminal from the grooves or from
the finger prints. In each case, the point is to start from the compulsory results of an act in order to discover this act.
PSYCHOIARCOSIS AND HUMAN DIGNITY

It is nevertheless certain that, though both problems are theoretically similar, their investigating ground can in no way be
compared. In one case, it is a matter of purely material signs,
and in the other, the problem is to do violence to the memory
and subconscious of the human person. Is the memory closely
enough related to what constitutes not the liberty but the dignity
of man to prohibit any investigation in this field?
In fact the memory seems to be a component part of the self,
but not of the personality of which it is only the support. An
animal submitted to psychonarcosis would theoretically show
the same reflexes as a man. Conversely, it is indisputable that
even the total amnesic do retain their human dignity. It would
therefore be inaccurate to locate in memory or in the subconscious what remains the intangible privilege of man.
The outrages against human dignity do not therefore result
from the kind of examination the subject may be submitted to.
Would they then rest in the fact of imposing upon him this examination without his consent?
In a deception case, in practically every possible hypothesis,
the deceiver, due to his own simulation, forbids himself to give
a valid approval. As a matter of fact, in a majority of cases,
madness is simulated, and it is hardly conceivable to request the
consent of an insane person or of anybody appearing to be
insane.
Furthermore, it is the undoubted interest of the expert phy-
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sicians not to let the person being examined know about the
nature of their investigations, which would really make their
task more difficult.
It seems therefore useless to raise the point of the assent in
this case; either the psychodiagnosis will practically never be
possible, or it is to be admitted that it can validly be replaced
by the order from the legal authority, and in this case the physician acts upon the order of the judicial authority and his position
cannot admit any criticism. This is sufficient to justify the use
of the psychodiagnosis in the course of all psychiatric examinations, as well as in all the cases when the physician has to discover a simulation.
On the contrary, in the case of an examination on fundamentals, the subject is quite in a position to give or refuse his assent,
at least theoretically. Because the fact of refusing his assent to
be examined under narcosis would naturally throw discredit upon
his denials, and the right, which would be acknowledged to him,
to accept or reject narcoanalysis, would have but a small practical significance, the suspect's assent can therefore never be
considered as free, neither in this case, nor in the case of the
psychodiagnosis. In this case, once more, psychonarcosis could
only enter the field of practice once it is admitted that the judicial
authority can replace the free assent of the subject.
TAWFUL

ss AND OPPORT=rNY OF NAco .A

mATo

It appears finally that the use of psychonarcosis does not
interfere with the essential rights of the human being, and that
it is lawful under the condition of acknowledging the society the
right of defeating the suspect's will upon certain points, and
not leaving him totally free to choose his means of defence.
Then it is no more human liberty which is interfered with,
as we have shown that the goal to which the examination under
narcosis aims is beyond the scope of this liberty, but it is one
of man's liberties which would be limited in this way-just the
same as that of keeping the secret of his correspondence, owning
an inviolable residence, or even coming or going; the seizure of
letters, the searchings, and detention on suspicion, as they do
not break the intangible principle of human liberty, do strangely
limit the use of man's liberties.
This points to one of the aspects of the difference generally
admitted between human liberty and man's liberties. On one
hand, no interference with human liberty is to be admitted. On
the other hapd, the problem is quite different when the limits
which the requirements of social life set to the human liberties
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are at stake. This conflict may be observed daily in all fields,
and may only be solved in weighing the seriousness of the hindrance brought to the exercise of man's liberties against the
importance of the social interest at stake.
No discussion is possible about the first point mentioned. The
use of psychonarcosis, as it deprives the indicted from choosing
freely his means of defence, constitutes a heavy restraint. To
try to escape punishment by lying is an attitude as old as this
world itself, and very likely a natural bent of human mind.
In contrast it is the interest of society to dispense justice
rightly, that is, to see the innocent at large and the guilty punished; but this is not a vital interest, and many famous civilizations of the past might easily be quoted, which have coexisted
with lamentable judicial customs. There are very few examples
that a reform of justice ever determined a reform in morals; it
must be acknowledged that the reverse was more frequently observed, no matter how disagreeable this finding may be to a
jurist.
The notion of social interest is only of a secondary importance
in this discussion. The sentence is not passed in the name of
social interest, but in the name of justice. Any theory would be
vain which would not be based upon a definition of the moral
and philosophic foundation of the idea of justice.
Very briefly, and with a rough approach, which we beg the
reader to pardon, it seems possible to classify into two main
categories the different schools from which the present legislations draw their inspiration, as well as the reform drafts under

study.
For one group, justice and repression are synonymous expressions, or almost so. An offence has been made, it must be
punished. The delinquent must receive a just punishment. But
the offence has to be proved all the same. It is the prosecutor's
job to produce the proof, and that of the indicted to fight it. In
this way the judge becomes the referee of a struggle in which
the opponents fight with equal weapons, as to favour one of the
parties to the case would interfere with the rights of his adversary. From these principles are issued the rules of procedure
familiar to the Anglosaxon countries and some features of which
are to be traced in the French penal code, as well as in the
legislations which it inspired. For instance, the Belgian constitution, article 7, foresees distinctly not only the respect for
the physical and moral integrity of the individual, but also his
supreme right to defend himself without restraint against any
proceedings which society might institute against him.

1949]

PSYCHONARCOSIS

IN FRANCE

In this case, the use of psychonarcosis could not be admitted.
It would alter the balance in that sort of modern "judicial duel"
between the defendant and society, which recalls so oddly the
game of cops and robbers which we played in the days of our
boyhood.
On the contrary, for others, who take for their own part
Pascal's words "punition of sin, error", the aim which men
assign to the action of their justice must not fundamentally be
the punishment of the noral offence of the delinquent. The
estimate of the gravity of this offence, which may differ so
widely in the case of offences apparently similar, would require
the knowledge of the psychology of each delinquent which undoubtedly will always remain beyond human possibilities, and
the magistrates, as they try to individualize the sentences they
pronounce, have no illusions on the lack of strictness in the
results they secure.
Furthermore, the lawfulness of such a punishment might
even be matter of discussion. It could be maintained that man's
conscience is by nature the reserved ground which escapes other
men's grasp', and that any interference in this domain would
break the principle of the respect due to the human being.
In this way, for the French school and many others, as the
resolutions carried out at the congress of San Remo draw their
inspiration from the same ideas, justice has to perform above all
a curative work; and its main purpose should be, not the punishment of the delinquent, but his reeducation. The notion of
punishment, if this argument was carried to its extreme logical
consequences, would then appear merely as one means amongst
others used towards the reformation and social readjustment of
the offender.
The action of justice would then become similar to some kind
of social prophylaxis which would justify the use of the appropriate means of detection. The decision made by the magistrate
would benefit as much the delinquent as society, and the purpose
of the judge would be not to punish but to cure all such people
as would show an anti-social behaviour. In this case the interest
of the indicted would justify the use of psychonarcosis in the
same way as in medicine the interest of the patient.
The present French legislation, which stands between these
two limits, does not apparently provide convincing arguments on
the ground of principles, and the jurists' opinions differ widely.
,Therefore the greatest importance should be conferred to the
examination of the practical consequences of the judiciary use
of penthotal.
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In fact, the narcoexamination obtains too rarely valuable results to contemplate its use at present. And even if a superpenthotal were perfected, it would be necessary to undertake
systematic research in order to train experts capable to avoid
or baffle the chances of suggestion or affabulation. It is doubtful
that this may be contemplated in the near future. 3
On the contrary, narcodiagnosis has already widely stood the
test of experience. Through its use, not only have malingerers'
schemes been brought to light; also the sincerity of patients who
did not show all the clinical symptoms of the illnesses which
they pretended to have has been revealed, and without it these
people would have very likely been the victims of errors in diagnosis from the expert physician. Striking instances of this case
may be found in the proceedings concerning injuries to workmen, or road accidents. These traumatisms are sometimes followed by strange sequels which do not seem to be linked with
any definite located lesion and which, as such, would have chances
not to be recognized by the experts, who are always inclined to
suspect malingering from the patients they examine. One of
the most striking examples which can be quoted is that of a
blindman whom the experts said to be a malingerer, when the
use of penthotal revealed his real blindness.
In this way, psychodiagnosis does not only allow to detect
malingering, but is also a valuable help to the sincere man. Owing to it, justice will not make so many errors, and many will
undoubtedly be of the opinion that the magistrate will never be
too much fit against the risk of judicial errors, and also that the
care to avoid the conviction of the innocent is worth whatever
penalties offenders may incur which they deserve.
3 Psychonarcosis may also be used in the course of psychiatric or psychoanalytic
examinations, the purpose of which is to learn the real motives which prompted the
offender's action. The problem in this case may be compared, and its use justified
in the same way as in the case of a narcodiagnosis.

